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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Ms. Bates timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction.

On

appeal, she argues that the district court erred when it failed inquire into Ms. Bates'
request for substitute counsel.

She also argues that the district court abused its

discretion when it denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and that her sentence is
excessively harsh.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Police responded to a call reporting a missing person, Robert Marek.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.)

When they arrived at

Mr. Marek's home, they noticed a fire in a fire pit in the back yard and what appeared to
be human body parts located in and around the fire. (PSI, p.2.) The police received
information indicating that Ms. Bates was Mr. Marek's niece and that she had recently
been staying at his home. (PSI, p.2.) An autopsy confirmed that there were human
remains around the fire, which belonged to Mr. Marek.

(PSI, p.2.)

Ms. Bates was

interrogated by the police and admitted that she had killed Mr. Marek. (PSI, p.2.)
Ms. Bates was charged, by information, with first degree murder. (R., pp.28-29.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended information alleging second
degree murder and, in return, Ms. Bates entered an Alford1 plea to second degree
murder. (R., pp.88-91.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified life sentence,
with thirty years fixed. (R., pp.102-103.) Ms. Bates timely appealed. (R., pp.108-110.)

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

1

Ms. Bates filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion
requesting leniency, which was denied by the district court.2 While her appeal was
pending, Ms. Bates also filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and requested the
appointment of new counsel, both of which were denied by the district court. 3

The materials related to the Rule 35 motion are located in the July 13, 2013 Motion to
Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.
3 The materials related to the motion to withdraw Ms. Bates' guilty plea are located in
the July 13, 2013 Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof.
2

2

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bates' motion for the appointment of
new counsel to represent her in regard to her motion to withdraw her guilty plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' motion to
withdraw her guilty plea?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence,
with thirty years fixed, upon Ms. Bates following her plea of guilty to second
degree murder?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Bates' Rule 35
motion requesting leniency?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion For The Appointment Of
New Counsel To Represent Her In Regard To Her Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
A.

Standard Of Review
The determination of whether a court conducted an adequate inquiry into why

substitute counsel should have been appointed and whether a person wishes to reject
the court appointed counsel and self-represent is reviewed de novo. See State v. Peck,
130 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 1997).

B.

The District Court Inadequately Inquired Into Ms. Bates' Request For Substitute
Counsel
Idaho Code Section 19-852 provides criminal defendants a statutory right to

counsel. I.C. § 19-852. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a statutory right to
counsel carries with it the correlative right to the effective assistance of counsel.

State v. Hall,_ P.3d _ , 2013 WL 6225673, at *4 (2013); 4 see also Hernandez v.
State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995) ("We can see no legitimate basis for determining
whether there has been a violation of the right to effective of counsel guaranteed by
I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has been a violation of a
similar constitutional right."). "The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel."

State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007).
"It is well settled that an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel includes the
right to effective assistance of counsel, but it does not necessarily include the right to an

4

The Hall Opinion analyzed the right to conflict free counsel in post-conviction
proceedings after the imposition of the death penalty.
4

attorney of one's own choice." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1995). While a
criminal defendant does not have the right to counsel of her choice, "for 'good cause' a
trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant."
Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594.

"An accused also has the right to waive court-appointed

counsel and to conduct his or her own defense." Id. "A defendant is not required to
show good cause for the desire to exercise that right." Id. "The trial court must afford
the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a
motion for substitution of counsel after having been made aware of the problems
involved." Id. (emphasis in original). This inquiry must occur even if the district court
has "well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and manipulative tactics," there can be
"no substitute for the inquires necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional rights."
Peck, 130 Idaho at 714.

While a district court must afford a defendant a full and fair opportunity to present
facts to support the request for the appointment of counsel, the duty to inquire does not
impose an onerous burden on the court. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found
that this duty to inquire was satisfied when the trial court asked the defendant to make
any statements he desired in support of his motion for substitute counsel.
Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980).

State v.

Conversely, in Peck, supra, this duty to inquire

was not satisfied when the Mr. Peck was not allowed to address the court concerning
his desire for substitute trial counsel.

Peck 130 Idaho at 713-14.

In coming to that

conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
As [Mr. Peck) points out, this Court cannot discern whether he had
legitimate grounds for his request for new counsel, such as an actual
conflict of interest or a deficiency in the public defenders' performance.
Nor can we ascertain from the record whether Peck wished to represent
himself, as was his right, in preference to continuing with representation
5

by the appointed counsel. The record reveals no reason for summarily
rejecting [Mr. Peck's} request, as the district court appears to have done.
Id. at 714. As stated above, this duty imposes a minimal burden on a district court.
Once a defendant has requested the appointment of substitute counsel, the district
court must provide a defendant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the request,
even if the district court has "well founded suspicions" that the request is merely a
means to manipulate the court. Id.
In this case, the district court failed to provide Ms. Bates the opportunity to
explain why she was requesting substitute counsel. Ms. Bates was represented by the
same defense attorney at the change of plea hearing, sentencing hearing, the Rule 35
hearing, and the hearing on the motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (R., pp.88-89, 99101; Minutes of the Rule 35 hearing held on December 14, 2012 (Augmentation);
05/17/13 Tr., p.3.) In Ms. Bates' affidavit in support of her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea, she wrote the following:
I was persistently forced in to signing I was tricked by only reading
last page last signing after just haven [sic] read a continue 2 second x
second day of meeting, for a more time to come up with money for trial
Not properly investigated knowledge with held knowledge of others
confession and explanasion [sic) the cover up
Motion of new counsel
(Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) (Augmentation),
p.1.)

Ms. Bates recognizes that the foregoing statements are somewhat unclear.

However, when the phrase "Motion of new counsel" is read in conjunction with the
preceding two paragraphs, it indicates that she wants a substitution of trial counsel
because she was tricked into agreeing to plead guilty and that there was a cover-up
and another person confessed to the killing.
6

From this record, one cannot tell to a

degree of reasonable certainty whether Ms. Bates wanted a substitute attorney or
wanted to represent herself pro se. In light of the clear standards set forth by the Idaho
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the district court should have, at a minimum,
ordered Ms. Bates to appear telephonically at the hearing on the motion to withdraw
her guilty plea and ask her why she wanted the appointment of substitute counsel.
Additionally, if this matter is remanded on the foregoing basis, and the district
court appoints substitute counsel, Ms. Bates is also entitled to another hearing on her
Rule 35 motion as Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel, which was lodged with the
district court on October 22, 2012, preceded the December 14, 2012, hearing on
Ms. Bates' Rule 35 motion. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c)
(Augmentation); Minutes of the Rule 35 hearing held on December 14, 2012
(Augmentation).)
In sum, this case must be remanded to afford Ms. Bates the opportunity to
explain why she requested the appointment of substitute counsel.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion To Withdraw
Her Guilty Plea

A.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

determining whether the

district court exercised

distinguished from arbitrary action.
1986).

sound judicial discretion

as

State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App.

"When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court

conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within
7

the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (quoting Associates
Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605 (Ct. App.1987)).

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bates' Motion To
Withdraw Her Guilty Plea
Motions for withdrawal of pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). Whether to grant a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such
discretion should be liberally applied. Freeman, 110 Idaho at 121. After a defendant
has been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally will be granted only to
correct manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886,
887 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). It is the
defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice would result if the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea were denied. State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178 (Ct. App.
1993). Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with
constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be entered
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887; Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
Ms. Bates can establish that the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty
resulted in a manifest injustice as her plea was not knowing and intelligent. In reliance
on I.C.R. 11, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that in order for a guilty plea to be
knowing and intelligent the defendant must be advised of all the direct consequences
resulting from the entry of the plea, which includes the minimum and maximum
punishments.

State v. Way, 117 Idaho 594, 597 (Ct. App. 1990). According to trial
8

counsel, Ms. Bates was not informed at the change of plea hearing that second degree
murder has a minimum sentence of ten years. (04/12/13 Tr., p.11, L.19 - p. 12, L.3;
05/17/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-21.) As such, her guilty plea was not entered knowingly and
intelligently.
Ms. Bates also argues that her guilty plea was not voluntary as it was the product
of coercion and fraud. "A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly
induced by ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537 (Ct. App.
2008).

In this case, Ms. Bates asserted that she was forced into signing the plea

agreement because the district court would not grant a continuance to afford her more
time to come up with money for trial. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 33(c), Augmentation, p.1.) Ms. Bates also asserted that she was "tricked"
into signing the plea agreement and was only shown the last page of the agreement.
(Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), Augmentation,
p.1.) While no more elaboration was provided to support these claims, it does appear
from Ms. Bates' affidavit that she was coerced to enter her guilty plea due to financial
pressures and that her guilty plea was obtained by fraud.
Additionally, Ms. Bates' guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as
she asserted the existence of a Brady violation. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held
that the constitutional validity of a guilty plea can be undermined in the event the State
fails to disclose both exculpatory and material evidence prior to the entry of the plea.

State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428 (Ct. App. 1994).

Before establishing that the

undisclosed evidence is both exculpatory and material, the "Brady violation should be
evaluated in light of all the attendant circumstances, including the following three

5

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
9

factors: (1) whether the plea was entered with advice of counsel, (2) whether the pleataking procedure complied with Boykin v. Alabama, 6 and (3) whether a factual basis
was established for the plea, i.e., whether the defendant's admissions fully establish his
factual guilt." Id. at 434-435. In this case, Ms. Bates does not challenge the fact that
her guilty plea was entered with the advice of counsel. However and as argued above,
she does argue that the guilty plea colloquy was inadequate as she was not informed
about that she was pleading guilty to an offense with a ten year minimum sentence.
(04/12/13 Tr., p.11, L.19-p. 12, L.3; 05/17/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.13-21.)
Ms. Bates also challenges the factual basis for her offense. In Gardner, supra,
the defendant did not challenge that his plea was either un-counseled or that the plea
colloquy was constitutionally infirm.

Id. at 435.

The Court of Appeals held that the

defendant could challenge the validity of his guilty plea based on the Brady violation
because he did not provide a factual basis for all of the elements for the offense to
which he pleaded guilty. Id.

In this case, Ms. Bates entered an Alford plea and, as

such, did not provide a factual basis for her offense. (R., pp.88-89.) In fact, Ms. Bates
asserted her innocence throughout the change of plea hearing and only pleaded guilty
because "I don't agree with the evidence that's been put forth. Do I agree? I agree that
yes, there could always be evidence that the State could put forth to convict any one
person." (04/04/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-19.) After she made that statement, she reiterated,

"I know I can go down for this, but I did not kill Robert Marek. I did not kill Uncle Bob."
(04/04/12 Tr., p.18, Ls.21-22.) Since an Alford plea was entered in this case and since
Ms. Bates maintained her innocence, she did not provide a factual basis for the offense,

6

See Boykin (requiring an affirmative showing on the record that the guilty plea was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).

10

and the alleged Brady violation can be the basis to undermine the district court's
conclusion that her guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Since Ms. Bates has established that she did not provide a factual basis for her
guilty plea she must establish that the undisclosed evidence is both exculpatory and
material in order to establish manifest injustice.

Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436.

In her

motion to withdraw her guilty plea, Ms. Bates stated that there was no proper
investigation in this matter and that information pertaining to a third party's confession
was withheld from her as part of a "cover up." (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), Augmentation, p.1.) If a third party had confessed to the
killing of Mr. Marek and information about an intentional "cover up" of this confession is
clearly exculpatory and material as it indicates that a person other than Ms. Bates is
guilty. Therefore, the district court erred when it denied Ms. Bates' motion to withdraw
her guilty plea as the Brady violation undermined the constitutional validity of her plea
and the district court's denial of her motion constituted a manifest injustice.
In sum, Ms. Bates' guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as she
was not informed about the ten year mandatory sentence, was tricked into signing her
plea agreement, and argued a Brady violation.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Life Sentence, With
Thirty Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Bates Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Second Degree
Murder
Ms. Bates asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified life sentence, with
thirty years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
11

character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Bates does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Ms. Bates must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Ms. Bates suffers from severe mental health issues. These issues are so severe
that they dominated the sentencing hearing. (See generally 05/24/12 Tr.) In fact, both
the State and the district court agreed that specific deterrence is not an issue in this
case because Ms. Bates cannot comprehend the true nature of her actions. (05/24/12
Tr., p.62, L.13 - p.63, L.2, p.76, Ls.13-19.) The district court also concluded, based on
the implicit premise that it is futile to punish a person that does not comprehend her
actions, that retribution is not much of a factor in this case. (05/24/12 Tr., p.76, L.1121.)

As such, the only truly relevant sentencing factors in this case are rehabilitation

and the protection of society.

With that in mind, the district court concluded that

Ms. Bates was amenable to mental health rehabilitation if she receives prolonged and
intense therapy. (05/24/12 Tr., p.76, L.22 - p.77, L.4.) As such, Ms. Bates argues that
thirty years fixed is excessive, and that the fixed portion of her sentence should be in
12

the range of ten to fifteen years. Such a sentence would provide her with the prolonged
access to intense therapy identified by the district court, which would promote both
rehabilitation and protection of society. If she is stabilized, reducing the fixed portion of
her sentence would enable her to get reintegrated into the community while she still has
a significant portion of her life ahead of her.
Additionally, there are various mitigating factors present in this matter which
support the conclusion that Ms. Bates' sentence is excessively harsh. As mentioned
above, the most significant mitigating factor in this case is Ms. Bates' mental health. As
a child, Ms. Bates received a head injury which inhibits her ability to read and write.
(PSI, p.8.) Despite this injury, Ms. Bates' aunt, Deanne Turcott, testified at sentencing,
that Ms. Bates was a normal child. (05/24/12 Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.32, L.12.)

Ms. Turcott

went on to state that when Ms. Bates was between twelve and thirteen years old, she
began to change. (05/24/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.13-14.) Ms. Turcott described the change in
Ms. Bates as follows:
[S]he started to kind of disconnect with the world and reality.
caught up in some drugs, started to get into trouble with the law.

She got

She lived with me and my husband for about six months when she was
around 15. And her mind got so focused on the fact that everyone was
either physically or sexually or emotionally abusing her that it kind of
became unsafe for her to be with us any longer. She started to believe
that people were abusing her and making accusations. And the neighbor
kids came to me and said, "She's -- she's got some ... illusions here.
She's starting to think that you guys are all abusing her."
(05/24/12 Tr., p.32, L.13 - p.33, L.5.) Ms. Turcott then expressed her sorrow for the loss
of Mr. Marek. (05/24/12 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.3.) She said he was a caring man with
a big heart and a gentle soul. (05/24/12 Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.3.) She then went on
to state the following:
13

I'm just asking the Court to recognize that Melisa's broke [sic].
Something inside her snapped ... a long time ago. And even though my
brother and sister did everything they could do to get her help -- and I
believe they did -- there wasn't really a lot of help to get. And in Idaho
there really continues not to be a lot of help to get.

I am afraid for Melisa, and despite all the psychological evals that
[say] she is normal and able to stand trial, I don't think she really
understands or ever was able to stand trial. I don't believe it, and I don't
think anybody in here does either.

I hope [someday] there will be a real diagnosis for Melisa, something that
they can treat, something that can help her, fix whatever got broke [sic] all
those years ago. [I] [h]ope that she'll understand the extent of what
happened and to live as a normal person someday.
(05/24/12 Tr., p.35, L.4 - p.36, L.18.)
Ms. Turcott's concerns over Ms. Bates' paranoid delusions about Ms. Bates'
sexual and physical victimization are consistent with version of events contained in the
police report documenting the interrogation of Ms. Bates. In that report, Officer Berger
wrote that Mr. Marek had told a friend that he was concerned about Ms. Bates as she
had accused him of wanting to have sex with her.
Berger, attached to PSI, p.3.)

(Police Report written by Officer

During the interrogation of Ms. Bates she cryptically

mentioned self defense, Mr. Marek, and incest.

(Police Report written by Officer

Berger, attached to PSI, p.5.)
Ms. Bates' trial counsel reaffirmed Ms. Turcott's statement that Ms. Bates was a
normal child until she entered her early teenage years. (05/24/12 Tr., p.63, L.9 - p.64,
L.6.) According to trial counsel, Ms. Bates disappeared for a few days and might have
ingested a drug or toxin that caused her mental health issues. (05/24/12 Tr., p.64, Ls.414.) Trial counsel indicated that her diagnoses were not consistent and they have
14

included borderline personality disorder,

antisocial disorder,

drug and alcohol

dependence, depression, mental illness, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar
disorder, brain injury, cognitive disjunction, and dual personality disorder.

(05/24/12

Tr., p.64, L.24 - p.65, L.17.) Counsel went on to state that it's "almost like we get a dart
and throw it at the wall and that's her diagnosis." (05/24/12 Tr., p.65, Ls.12-16.) For
example, Dr. Barkley diagnosed Ms. Bates with Chronic Undifferentiated Schizophrenia
in 2004, and in 2012 Dr. Hayes did not determine she was schizophrenic; instead,
Dr. Hayes diagnosed her as having Major Depressive Disorder and Borderline
Personality Disorder. (Mental Health Report written by Dr. Hayes, dated May 20, 2012
(Augmentation), pp. 7, 9-11.)
Ms. Bates was also involuntarily committed in her early twenties. When she was
twenty one years old, she was charged with writing a check with insufficient funds and
was deemed incompetent to go forward with her defense.
(Augmentation), p.312.)

(Mitigation Report Vol. I

As a result, she was involuntarily committed to the State

Hospital North. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), p.312.) The doctor who found
her incompetent stated that she was profoundly impaired and could barely
communicate.

(Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), p.312.)

Ms. Bates was

stabilized and discharged from the facility approximately six months after her admission.
(Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), pp.313-316.) This evinces that Ms. Bates is
amenable to mental health treatment.
Additionally, Ms. Bates' substance addiction is a mitigating factor. Ms. Bates was
exposed to alcohol when she was a toddler and used "sippie cups" to consume the
alcohol.

(PSI, p.9.)

Ms. Bates' use of alcohol and other substances persisted

throughout her childhood and teenage years. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation),
15

pp.255-256, 359.)7 When Ms. Bates was fourteen years old, one evaluator concluded
that alcohol and substance abuse were considerable problems for Ms. Bates.
(Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation), pp.256.)
detention" facility when she was sixteen.

Ms Bates was in a "drug juvenile

(Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation),

p.412.)
Ms. Bates was also the victim of abuse as a child. It was so bad that she was
placed into foster care at the age of twelve. (Mitigation Report Vol. I (Augmentation),
pp.348-349, 412.) One of Ms. Bates' neighbors reported an incident in which her father
was sitting on her while "shoving rocks down her throat."

(Mitigation Report Vol. II

(Augmentation), p.192.) Ms. Bates stated that she had been raped by a twenty three
year old when she was eleven years old, became pregnant, and then miscarried.
(Mental Health Report written by Dr. Hayes, dated May 20, 2012 (Augmentation), p.4.)
Despite the foregoing setbacks, Ms. Bates is hardworking and sacrificed years of
her life to help others.

One of her friends, Scott Taylor, had a mother that needed

twenty-four hour care because she was an Alzheimer's patient. (05/24/2012 Tr., p.43,
L.2 - p.44, L. 17.) Ms. Bates lived with Mr. Taylor for approximately three and one-half
years.

(05/24/12 Tr., p.45, Ls.5-11.

p.47, L.13 - p.49, L.17.)

During that time,

Ms. Bates played an indispensable role changing bed sheets and washing clothes.
(05/24/12 Tr., p.44, Ls.20-25.) She also bathed and fed Mr. Taylor's mother. (05/24/12
Tr., p.23-24.)

According to Mr. Taylor, "I personally don't believe that Melisa was

capable of these atrocities. I don't know. And no matter where or what happens from
here, I would like to see that Melisa got help to take care of whatever her problems are."

7

For ease of citation the pages in the Mitigation Report have been numbered
sequentially.
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(05/24/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.13-17.) On this note, M's. Bates' trial counsel stated that in her
support letters she was considered by others as loving, happy, pleasant, respectful,
trustworthy, grateful, helpful, caring, friendly, patient, busy, and selfless.

(05/24/12

Tr., p.65, Ls.67-24.)
Ms. Bates also has support and is trusted by other people in the community. For
example, William Sexton wrote a letter to the court which stated that she is hardworking, and that he trusted her with the key to his home. (Letter written by William
Sexton (augmentation).) Patti Naccarato wrote the court a letter indicating that she is
"eternally grateful" to Ms. Bates for saving Ms. Naccarato's husband's life.

(Letter

written by Patti R. Naccarato (Augmentation).)

Ms. Naccarato also stated that she

never had any reason to mistrust Ms. Bates.

(Letter written by Patti R. Naccarato

(Augmentation).) Mr. Naccarato also wrote a letter expressing sentiments similar to his
wife's.

(Letter written by Roland Naccarato (Augmentation).)

These are just a few

examples of the positive support letters Ms. Bates received, the majority of which depict
her as a caring and hardworking person that is trusted in the community.

(Letters

written by Robert and Linda Carroll, Gordon Nyberg, James B. Keirklie, Jacque
Knowles, and Mary Kuhfuss (Augmentation).)
There was one letter which indicated that Ms. Bates had verbally accosted a
couple and they were scared of Ms. Bates. (Letter written by Randy and Vicki Rowe
(Augmentation).) Shad Panter wrote a support letter indicating that some of the Rowes'
opinions of Ms. Bates should be discredited.

(Letter written by Shad Panter

(Augmentation).) Mr. Panter wrote the following about the Rowes:
I have heard that
disparaging [letter]
this as it seems to
to her weaknesses

Randy and [Vickie] Rowe ... have written [a] very
about [Ms. Bates] and I would disagree with them on
me they are the worst culprits of harassing her to play
to get a rise out of her. And I do not like bullies. As far
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[as] the police getting a confession out of her it's bogus with her
diagnosed mental state you push hard and long enough she'll break and
give anything you want to escape adversity. Which they may not have
known at the time but to [punish her further] and keep her away from
friends is unnecessary and fruitless and a waste of taxes ....
(Letter written by Shad Panter (Augmentation).) As such, Ms. Bates can function in the
community and many people trust and care for her.
In sum, Ms. Bates suffers from severe mental health issues, which inhibit her
ability to understand the underlying offense.

However, she is amenable to mental

health treatment and when she is stabilized she is considered by the community as a
hardworking and caring person.

As such, the district court abused its discretion by

imposing an excessively harsh sentence.

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Bates' Rule 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Ms. Bates provided new information in support of her Rule 35 motion.

After

Ms. Bates was sentenced she completed the "Living with Mental Illness Class."
(Supplemental Motion to Reduce Sentence (Augmentation), p.2.) Ms. Bates is also "a
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Janitor of Unit 3 where she sweeps, mops and cleans rooms. She also mows yards.
Ms. Bates is allowed to wear regular jeans and shirts.

She earns $0.30 per hour."

(Supplemental Motion to Reduce Sentence {Augmentation), p.2.) Ms. Bates has not
been a problem in that facility.

(Supplemental Motion to Reduce Sentence

(Augmentation), p.2.)
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 35 motion
requesting leniency as Ms. Bates new information indicated that she was making
rehabilitative progress after she was sentenced in this matter.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Bates respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with
instructions for the district court to inquire into Ms. Bates' request for substitute counsel.
Ms. Bates also requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions to allow
Ms. Bates to withdraw her guilty plea. Alternatively, Ms. Bates requests that this Court
reduce the fixed portion of her sentence from thirty years to either ten or fifteen years.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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